Researchers warn of critical losses for grain producers and price increases for consumers worldwide. According to the study “From Farm to Futures: Competition, Financialization, and Digitalization in Global Grain Value Chains” prepared by a group of experts, total losses are estimated at no less than $2.5 billion per year for the main BRICS grain exporters (www.BRICSCompetition.org).

The research findings were presented by the HSE BRICS Competition Law and Policy Centre during the 9th BRICS International Competition Conference held in Cape Town. The study offers an innovative approach to analysis from the perspective of global processes. Traditional antitrust analysis of the grain market has focused primarily on horizontal competition—interaction at the same level of the supply chain. However, to gain a deeper understanding of market dynamics in the BRICS countries, an analysis of vertical competition is being conducted, which involves examining the relationships between different levels of the supply chain, including producers, traders, infrastructure operators, and financial intermediaries—from the field and port to the consumer. Researchers are paying particular attention to the activities of global grain traders through the prism of the economic and technological changes that markets are undergoing today.

According to the authors of the study, the global grain market has long been controlled by an oligopoly of major agricultural traders known as ABCD+ (ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus Company + COFCO, Olam, etc.). This concentration of market power, as well as certain structural features of this market, make it vulnerable to price fluctuations and various types of speculative behavior, which negatively affects both grain producers and consumers.

The merger of Bunge and Viterra in one of the world's most competitive agricultural markets—Canada—has created an empirically sound precedent for assessing the global risks of the new deal. An antitrust investigation conducted in Canada found that the consolidation of control over grain transshipment rates in Vancouver led to a 15% increase in the cost of grain passing through this hub, or a loss of $412 million annually for shipping producers. It is important to note that this is a non-market price increase. A 15% “monopoly markup” on logistics and trading, applied to 20% of the volume, could cost Russia and Brazil an additional $2.5 billion per year.

In addition, the study highlights several key trends that are currently having a direct impact on farmers, consumers and the grain trade worldwide.  Firstly, there is financialisation, i.e. the close integration of financial and trading infrastructure. Secondly, traders' financial activity is made possible by information asymmetry access to exclusive data that other market participants do not have. Thirdly, there is a new type of interaction co-opetition (cooperation in a competitive environment). Despite the struggle for profit and market share, traders jointly invest in infrastructure and coordinate control of supply chains. The report presents for the first time unique schemes of corporate relations and the participation of strategic investors in the structure of ABCD+ traders' work and management. In addition, digital platforms such as Covantis and TRACT are already helping ABCD+ traders coordinate economic activity and limit competition from national and regional players often outside the purview of BRICS antitrust authorities.

Researchers suggest that BRICS antitrust authorities could conduct their own large-scale market analysis and use it as a basis for developing coordinated antitrust response measures. Among such measures are structural prescriptions. First and foremost, the report proposes involving the antitrust regulators of the BRICS countries in the design of the BRICS Grain Exchange as a single platform where pricing will be more transparent and, most importantly, hedging mechanisms will be more transparent. The grain exchange has already been initiated by the leaders of the BRICS countries, and if implemented correctly, it could be a step towards reducing price volatility, increasing pricing transparency, and improving the quality of market competition in the global grain market.