info@businessghana.com
It is hard to overstate the sense of shock reverberating across West Africa after attackers, in co-ordinated assaults, managed to enter Mali's capital, Bamako, assassinate the defence minister and seize control of northern areas.
Residents in different cities across the country woke to gunfire and explosions on Saturday - attacks which an alliance of two groups - the separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM group - said they were behind.
The scale of the offensive and the withdrawal of Malian and Russian forces from the northern city of Kidal, now under FLA control, have fuelled doubts about the strength of the military government led by Col Assimi Goïta, who came to power in a coup in August 2020.
It has taken Goïta several days to make an appearance since the offensive, prompting questions about the junta's future, as well as the role of Russian forces deployed in Mali and neighbouring countries to tackle the security threat.
So what will happen next?
Many analysts believe this remains the most likely short-term outcome, as the military still controls most major cities and towns as well as state institutions.
But they say the coming days could be critical as the army launches a counter-offensive against JNIM and the FLA.
Its success or otherwise will "determine the longevity of the junta", according to Beverly Ochieng, a senior analyst at global consultancy firm Control Risks.
Three days after the offensive, Col Goïta made a televised address to the nation, saying the situation was under control and vowing to "neutralise" those responsible for the attacks.
Earlier, the presidency's social media accounts posted photos of Col Goïta meeting Russia's ambassador to Mali, Igor Gromyko, a sign of the importance the junta still puts on that alliance.
It also had photos of the coup leader visiting a hospital where those wounded in the attack are being treated.
However, analysts say the death of Defence Minister Sadio Camara could weaken military co-ordination during any counter-offensive.
Camara's death may also hamper the relationship with Russia, according to Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel programme at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a centre-right German think-tank.
Camara was one of the most powerful figures in the ruling structure and "the main interlocutor for Moscow and the brain behind the deployment of Russian mercenaries in the Sahel", he added.
Mali's presidency released this photo of a meeting between Col Goïta and the Russian ambassador
While Malian forces say they are fighting to secure key parts of the country, it will have a struggle on its hands as the FLA has signalled its ambitions to move south from Kidal.
"We want to take control of Gao city. All of Gao's gates have fallen, but the camps of the army have not," said spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane.
He told the BBC the historic city of Timbuktu was also in their sights: "It will be easy to take over once we fully control Gao and Kidal."
The junta had popular support when it seized power nearly six years ago, promising to deal with Mali's long-running security crisis.
But it has already been forced into a defensive position over the last year by JNIM's fuel blockade on the capital, as militants broadened their insurgency to include economic warfare.
If armed groups do manage to sustain an advance, Mali could face a prolonged conflict, affecting the future of the junta.
Last weekend's attacks also damaged Russia's image as a reliable security partner in Mali, Ochieng says.
Following the military takeover at the beginning of the decade, French forces, which had been supporting the army, were told to leave and Russian fighters came in their place to help curb the insurgency.
The Russians' reputation "has taken a huge blow" after the failure of its Africa Corps to defend major cities and the fall of Kidal, Laessing adds.
Malian newspapers have been carrying stories about the killed defence minister
While sticking with Russian support, Mali could be pushed to widen its military partnerships.
One possible option could involve closer ties with Turkey, which has been seeking to expand its influence in Africa.
Ochieng says there have been reports of a Turkish security contact being deployed "to train the presidential guard" in Mali.
Turkey already has defence ties with Mali, supplying it with drones which reportedly played a decisive role in helping the military take back Kidal from rebel control in 2024.
Mali has also shown signs of renewed engagement with the US after years of strained relations.
Earlier this year, Nick Hocker, head of the State Department's African affairs section, travelled to Bamako to express US "respect for Mali's sovereignty" and outline a "new course" in relations, aimed at moving "past policy missteps".
He also said the US intended to work more closely with Mali's neighbours and allies, Burkina Faso and Niger, on shared security and economic priorities.
Bamako could also lean more heavily on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which brings together Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso - all military-led governments.
The bloc has pledged support for Mali, though it has yet to act as a major joint fighting force.
For Russia, the key question is whether it can maintain influence if Mali diversifies its security ties.
The crisis could also become a test of its wider strategy in Africa, where Moscow has expanded influence through military partnerships.
If Russian-backed forces are seen as unable to protect key allies, other governments in the region may reconsider how much they rely on Moscow.
Saturday's attacks have created the most serious challenge to military rule in years.
Further attacks could intensify pressure on the military government as public discontent grows.
One possible outcome is another military coup, with a different group of officers taking power.
Alternatively, an FLA-JNIM alliance could replace the current government but it would face serious internal tensions.
The FLA presents itself as a political and nationalist movement, while JNIM is an armed Islamist group.
Mali's separatists and Islamists groups have had an on-off relationship for years - going back to 2012 when the ethnic Tuareg separatist rebellion was hijacked by Islamist militants.
An FLA spokesman earlier described JNIM fighters as their "cousins", adding that "we share the same enemy, so we have to be under the same umbrella".
But FLA leader Sayed Bin Bella later told the BBC there was "no merger".
"All the flags we have raised are our own, not those of al-Qaeda. If they wish to merge with us, they must withdraw from the global al-Qaeda organisation," he said.
Analysts say these differences could complicate any future power-sharing arrangement.
JNIM has, in recent years, largely avoided the openly global jihadist rhetoric often associated with al-Qaeda and similar groups, says Ochieng.
She argues one possibly outcome could be a Syria-type situation where a group that was once affiliated to al-Qaeda takes power.
Syria's leadership has been criticised by some hard-line Islamists for being too secular.
Similar accusations are already being directed at JNIM because of its alliance with the FLA, analysts who monitor jihadist media channels have reported.
However, differences in ideology between JNIM and the FLA could become a future source of tension, unless the separatists secure full control of the north and distance themselves from developments elsewhere in the country.
