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After repeated, unsuccessful mediation efforts between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, President Félix Tshisekedi sent a letter to U.S. President Donald Trump, offering access to the DRC’s critical minerals in exchange for security assistance.
On June 27, 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed a U.S.-brokered peace agreement in Washington, D.C., hailed as a breakthrough after decades of conflict in eastern Congo. Beyond the billions of dollars in promised investments, the deal was presented as a historic peace-for-minerals exchange.
“In a region where peace is measured in lives spared, the collapse of this deal is more than a diplomatic failure, it’s a betrayal of hope.”
Yet, within weeks, fighting resumed, civilians were killed, and the agreement collapsed.
To understand the collapse, we must first examine how the deal was constructed,and where it faltered.
Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner led the DRC delegation and signed the peace deal on behalf of the Presidency. While her efforts were commendable, the process lacked the institutional legitimacy that a durable peace agreement demands. A proper democratic process should have included:
Inclusive Negotiation Phase: Representatives from the Ministries of Mines, Defense, Parliament, Senate, civil society, and local communities, especially in Kivu, should have been involved.
Transparent Drafting: Parliamentary oversight, public debate, and expert input would have strengthened legitimacy.
Ratification by Parliament: In most democracies, binding international treaties require majority approval in both the National Assembly and Senate, followed by constitutional review.
Implementation Framework: A joint body involving the DRC, Rwanda, the AU, and neutral guarantors (SADC, EAC, UN), alongside civil society and NGOs.
Monitoring & Enforcement: Without enforcement tools, the deal was symbolic. A joint monitoring body with the AU or UN should have been created.
Accountability & Reporting: The Presidency should have been obliged to report implementation progress to Parliament regularly.
For the deal to have democratic legitimacy, the U.S. should have insisted on stronger institutional processes:
Institutional Legitimacy: Washington should have required parliamentary ratification in Kinshasa before signing, rather than accepting a single ministerial signature.
Inclusive Delegations: Invitations should have extended beyond the Presidency’s envoy to include the Ministry of Mines, Parliament, civil society, and eastern provincial leaders.
Transparency Measures: The U.S. could have demanded that the agreement text be shared with Parliament and civil society before signing.
Monitoring & Enforcement: Congress could have debated or passed resolutions to strengthen oversight and political backing for the deal.
Instead, the U.S. accepted a narrow, elite-driven process, contradicting its own stated commitment to democracy.
While Qatar stepped in as a mediator, its approach raised new questions about neutrality and effectiveness.
On July 19, 2025, Qatar hosted follow-up talks and signed the Doha Declaration of Principles with the M23 rebel group.
The Doha Declaration, signed with M23 representatives, outlined ceasefire terms and reintegration plans, but lacked enforcement teeth and failed to include key stakeholders.
Its role could have made the difference, but fell short.
Inclusive Mediation: Qatar should have ensured participation not only from elites but also from the Congolese Parliament, civil society, and affected groups, including FDLR concerns.
Independent Facilitation: Rather than aligning closely with U.S. strategy, Qatar could have reinforced African ownership by working through the AU, SADC, and EAC.
Economic Incentives for Peace: With its financial clout, Qatar could have created a peace dividend fund, supported infrastructure for local benefit, and financed reintegration programs for ex-combatants.
Monitoring & Verification: By funding an independent monitoring commission (AU, UN, local representatives), Qatar could have tied its credibility to implementation and pressed all parties to comply.
Deals involving national resources must be anchored in law, not executive discretion. The mineral peace deal was never ratified by the D R Congo Parliament or debated publicly, undermining the very institutions meant to safeguard sovereignty.
The result was a missed opportunity: a presidentially driven, transactional exchange, minerals for vague security promises, without enforceable guarantees. Even President Paul Kagame expressed doubts, warning that peace would not hold without addressing root causes such as the FDLR militia and regional rivalries.
He warned: President Kagame warned: “Peace cannot be imposed from outside, it must be built from within.
He was proven right. The M23 resumed attacks, and the ceasefire collapsed.
When peace collapses, the heaviest burden falls on the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Communities continue to endure displacement, massacres, and widespread sexual violence, with millions of Congolese trapped in cycles of exploitation and instability. The instability reverberates across borders, fueling refugee flows into Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, straining regional economies and undermining trust in continental institutions. This persistent suffering undermines any prospect of achieving sustainable peace by 2030.
Beyond the DRC, Africa as a whole loses yet another chance to secure a homegrown, self-determined peace process, one led by its own institutions and citizens. Meanwhile, foreign interests, particularly U.S. firms, may paradoxically still benefit from privileged access to critical minerals. Peace cannot be bought with minerals; it is built on justice, sovereignty, and solidarity.
Conclusion
To restore the credibility and legitimacy of the peace process, it is imperative that the Congolese Government support the call for a genuine National Dialogue, an inclusive platform that brings together all stakeholders around a shared vision of peace and stability.
It is equally essential to reintegrate and involve continental and regional powers such as the African Union, SADC, and the East African Community. This time, however, the process must be grounded in transparent negotiations, open dialogue, and a sincere commitment to lasting peace.
